POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE(S) FOR THE PROMOTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL INTEGRITY IN SOCIETY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RONALD DWORKIN
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71105/Keywords:
Moral integrity, paternalism, liberalism, ethical behavior, politics.Abstract
The promotion of moral integrity in society is one of the political objectives which, in some cases, push the State to adopt some regulations which limit individuals’ liberties. Those regulations, which are coercive in their nature, are usually defended on the basis of the moral end they are intended to promote in society. Yet, philosophical views differ on potential approach which would be more relevant for promoting moral integrity in society. This normative inquiry has put at odd two competing philosophical viewers, namely, paternalists and liberals. This paper analyses and discusses Dworkin’s arguments which defend the liberal approach as the sole relevant strategy for promoting moral integrity in society, and then argue that while one may agree with Ronald Dworkin in some of his arguments, particularly those against crude paternalism, the paternalistic approach cannot be rejected in all its forms in the project of promoting moral integrity in society. In some circumstances, paternalism as political approach for promoting moral integrity, is not only politically justified but also morally required.
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